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INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT
The panel’s decision conflicts with binding U.S. Supreme Court preemption
decisions, as well as precedent from this and other circuits concerning the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. In holding that the
CDA did not preempt Santa Monica’s short-term rental Ordinance (“Ordinance”),
the panel took a form-over-substance approach to preemption that provides
localities a roadmap for circumventing the CDA. Further, the panel’s decision
raises issues of exceptional importance because, left undisturbed, it will
substantially impair e-commerce throughout this Circuit—home to the world’s
most innovative Internet companies.
Congress adopted the CDA to “encourage the unfettered and unregulated
development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of ecommerce” by keeping “‘government interference in the medium to a minimum.’”
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003). The CDA accomplishes
these goals by providing websites like Airbnb, Inc. and HomeAway.com, Inc.
(“Platforms”) “broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
[them] liable for information originating with a third-party user,’” Perfect 10, Inc.
v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007), and protecting websites
against any duty to monitor or remove third-party content, Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009). The CDA has played an indispensable

1
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role in the rise of Internet businesses that have transformed daily lives, as well as
countless startups that may someday do the same. In particular, it has facilitated
the development of online marketplaces like the Platforms, which operate websites
where third parties can post short-term rental listings and guests can reserve listed
properties.
The Ordinance—and the panel decision upholding it—strike at the heart of
the CDA and the innovation it has spurred. The Ordinance penalizes the Platforms
if they fail to screen third-party rental listings that are not registered and compliant
with local law before guests “book” reservations for those listings. The panel
acknowledged that the practical effect of the law will be to compel the Platforms to
“remov[e] certain [third-party] listings” from their websites; indeed, the panel
identified no other compliance option. Slip op. 15. If a Platform fails to do so, it
faces liability every time someone “books” an unregistered listing.
Such a local requirement to police third-party listings is incompatible with
the CDA. It makes no difference that the Ordinance does not expressly require
content monitoring and removal; under settled Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
preemption authority, the Ordinance’s undisputed practical effect is dispositive.
The Court should grant rehearing or rehearing en banc for four reasons:
First, the panel ignored Supreme Court precedent requiring courts to
evaluate preemption by focusing on “what the state law in fact does” rather than on

2
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its formally expressed requirements. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627,
637 (2013); National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 464 (2012). This Court
applied that reasoning when it rejected “creative” attempts to “circumvent the
CDA’s protections” in Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016).
As the panel acknowledged, the Ordinance will have the practical effect of making
the Platforms remove third-party listings. Slip op. 14-15. Even though the CDA
plainly forbids the City from expressly requiring the Platforms to remove listings,
the panel allowed the City to evade CDA preemption by ignoring what the
Ordinance in fact does and focusing on the Ordinance’s form, which technically
penalizes the Platforms only for offering “booking” services.

The Platforms

briefed National Meat, Wos, and Kimzey at length. See Opening Brief at 1-3, 13,
24-28, 40-42; Reply at 1, 7-8, 11, 18. But the panel did not mention, much less
follow, those decisions, and thereby created Supreme Court and intra-circuit
conflicts.
Second, the panel’s decision conflicts with First and Second Circuit
decisions holding that the CDA protects “features that are part and parcel of the
overall design and operation of [a] website,” including the provision of payment
services for transactions involving third-party content.

Jane Doe No. 1 v.

Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2016) (CDA protects website’s
“anonymous payment” feature); Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 2019 WL 1384092, at *3

3
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(2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2019) (CDA protects “design and operation” of app). The panel
rejected CDA protection for facially neutral website features like booking services,
even when those features are inextricably tied to third-party content and central to
the design of the Platforms’ websites. The Ordinance would force the Platforms to
redesign their websites or modify their operations, including with respect to how
they provide booking services for listings, as well as by monitoring and removing
unregistered listings. This split with the First and Second Circuits provides an
independent basis for rehearing.
Third, the panel’s decision creates a gaping exception to CDA immunity by
holding that the CDA does not apply to requirements to monitor “internal” and
“nonpublic” third-party content. Slip op. 14. The panel cited no authority for this
proposition, and this holding, too, creates intra- and inter-circuit conflicts. It
conflicts with this Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846,
853 (9th Cir. 2016), which recognized that Section 230 precludes liability for
“failure to adequately … monitor internal communications” on websites.
(Emphasis added.) And it conflicts with decisions from sister circuits, which hold
that the CDA preempts laws that require monitoring of non-public third-party
content. Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *2 (CDA applies to “direct messages with
other users”); Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21.

4
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Fourth, in rejecting the Platforms’ obstacle preemption arguments, the panel
construed the CDA’s purpose as only protecting websites that filter and screen
offensive content. Slip op. 17. But this Circuit has long recognized that Section
230 also was designed “to promote the development of e-commerce.” Batzel, 333
F.3d at 1027. The Ordinance is an obstacle to that purpose because, as the panel
recognized, its ruling presents numerous online marketplaces (from the Platforms
to eBay to TaskRabbit to startups) with the very choice the CDA was intended to
prohibit: endure “the difficulties of complying with numerous state and local
regulations” that compel specific types of content removal, or turn back the clock
and adopt a Craigslist-type bulletin board model, abandoning the innovative ecommerce services that characterize the modern Internet. Slip op. 16, 21. By
embracing this massive technological regression, jeopardizing the development of
the Internet economy, and thus thwarting one of Section 230’s central purposes,
the panel’s decision presents a question of extraordinary importance.
BACKGROUND
I.

Airbnb and HomeAway
The Platforms provide online marketplaces that allow “hosts” to post listings

advertising their homes for rental and enable guests and hosts to find each other
online, where they can enter into direct agreements to reserve and book listings.
ER-1836-37 ¶¶ 27–28; ER-1868-69 ¶¶ 16–18.

5
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increasing demand for overnight accommodations (often at a lower cost than a
hotel, with the conveniences of home) with residents’ desire to earn extra income.
Hosts alone determine whether to post listings and what content to include in them,
and set their own prices and lengths of stay. ER-1837 ¶¶ 30–31; ER-1869 ¶ 19.
The Platforms inform hosts to be aware of and comply with local laws, and provide
information about applicable regulations.

ER-1839-40 ¶¶ 39–40; ER-1869-70

¶ 23.
II.

Santa Monica’s Regulation of the Platforms
Santa Monica’s regulation of the Platforms began in 2015, when it passed an

ordinance regulating short-term rentals. That ordinance expressly targeted the
Platforms’ publication of third-party content, prohibiting them from “facilitat[ing]”
or “advertis[ing]” short-term rental listings that failed to comply with City laws.
ER-24. The Platforms sued, alleging CDA preemption.
The City amended the original ordinance. The amended law has the same
effect and objective as the original: it coerces the Platforms into monitoring and
policing third-party content on their websites. ER-95-96. Seeking to circumvent
Section 230, the Ordinance refrains from overtly regulating website content.
Instead, it requires that the Platforms “not complete any booking transaction for
any residential property or unit unless” a listing is registered and complies with
City law “at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking

6
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transaction.”

S.M. Mun. Code §§ 6.20.010(c); 6.20.050(c).

Penalties include

imprisonment for six months and a $500 fine. Id. § 6.20.100(a), (c).
The Platforms amended their complaint to challenge the Ordinance.
III.

Decisions Below
The district court rejected the Platforms’ CDA preemption claims and

dismissed their complaints. The panel affirmed.
The panel first rejected the argument that the Ordinance required the
Platforms to monitor third-party content. In the panel’s view, “the only monitoring
that appears necessary to comply with the Ordinance relates to incoming requests
to complete a booking transaction—content that, while resulting from the thirdparty listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic.” Slip op. 14.
The panel then rejected the Platforms’ argument that the Ordinance was
preempted because, as a practical matter, it would compel the Platforms to remove
certain third-party content. As it must at the motion to dismiss stage, the panel
“accept[ed] at face value the Platforms’ assertion that they [would] choose to
remove noncompliant third-party listings on their website as a consequence of the
Ordinance,” and acknowledged that was the “most practical compliance option.”
Slip op. 14-15. Nonetheless, it held that the CDA did not preempt the Ordinance
because it did not technically require content removal. Id. at 15.

7
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Finally, the panel held that the Ordinance is not obstacle preempted. In
doing so, the panel isolated one of Congress’s aims in passing the CDA:
encouraging Internet companies voluntarily to filter objectionable third-party
content. Id. at 16-17. Apparently concluding that this was Congress’s only goal,
the panel ruled the Ordinance did not stand as an obstacle to that one purpose. Id.
at 17-18.
REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING
I.

The Panel Decision Conflicts with Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and
Other Circuits’ Precedent by Ignoring the Ordinance’s Practical Effect
of Requiring Content-Removal.
The panel erred by refusing to give any legal significance to the Ordinance’s

overriding practical effect: requiring the Platforms to monitor and remove noncompliant third-party listings from their websites. “[A]ny activity that can be
boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post
online is perforce immune under section 230.”

Fair Hous. Council of San

Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc). The panel acknowledged the CDA preempts any law requiring the
Platforms to remove third-party content. Slip op. 12. The panel also accepted—as
required at this stage—that the Platforms will “remove noncompliant third-party
listings … as a consequence of the Ordinance.” Slip op. 15; see ER-1848 ¶ 70;
ER-1867 ¶ 9; ER-504 ¶ 13.

8
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Nonetheless, the panel held that Section 230 does not preempt the Ordinance
because it technically allows the Platforms to leave unregistered listings on their
websites. In the panel’s view, while removal of third-party listings would be the
practical effect of the Ordinance, “[o]n its face” the Ordinance did not “mandate”
their removal. Slip op. 15.
This formalistic preemption analysis conflicts with precedent of the Supreme
Court, this Circuit, and other circuits. The Supreme Court has held that a “proper”
preemption “analysis requires consideration of what the state law in fact does, not
how the litigant might choose to describe it.” Wos, 568 U.S. at 637. Legislators
may not “evade the pre-emptive force of federal law by resorting to ... description
at odds with the statute’s intended operation and effect.” Id. at 636. Likewise, this
Court has held, in the CDA context, that a party cannot use “creative” efforts to
plead around and “circumvent the CDA’s protections,” Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1266,
a principle equally applicable to regulatory attempts to evade Section 230.
National Meat—which the panel did not cite, much less discuss—illustrates
the point.

There, the Supreme Court considered whether the Federal Meat

Inspection Act (“FMIA”) preempted a California law regulating meat sales. The
FMIA regulates slaughterhouse operations and preempts state laws imposing
overlapping requirements. California argued the FMIA did not preempt its law
because it did not formally regulate slaughterhouse operations but, instead,

9
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regulated only “the last stage of a slaughterhouse’s business,” i.e., the “sale[]” of
meat after it left the slaughterhouse. The Court rejected California’s argument as
making a “mockery” of preemption, reasoning that the operation and effect of a
sales ban would be to regulate slaughterhouse activities that were subject to FMIA
preemption. 565 U.S. at 463-64. “[I]f the sales ban were to avoid the FMIA’s
preemption clause, then any State could impose any regulation on slaughterhouses
just by framing it as a ban on the sale of meat produced in whatever way the State
disapproved.” Id. The Court flatly rejected arguments that preemption analysis
focuses on the formal requirements of the statute, rather than its practical
consequences.

See Brief for Non-State Respondents, National Meat Ass’n v.

Harris, 2011 WL 4590839, at *48 (Oct. 3, 2011) (arguing “[t]he focus is always on
what conduct the state law duty directly pertains to”).
Here, as in National Meat, the Ordinance regulates only “the last stage of the
[Platforms’] business,” i.e., the booking transaction. 565 U.S. at 463. But as in
National Meat, the practical effect of the Ordinance, contrary to federal law, is to
require the Platforms to review and remove listings or face liability. Thus, just as
in National Meat, federal law preempts the Ordinance. The panel’s preemption
analysis conflicts with the Supreme Court’s preemption framework.
For similar reasons, the panel’s analysis conflicts with Retail Industry
Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), which held that the

10
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preempted a Maryland law
requiring employers to pay the state if they did not “spend up to 8% of the total
wages paid to employees in the State on health insurance costs.” Id. at 184
(citation omitted). Although the law did not expressly regulate employee benefits,
“[i]n effect, [employers’] only rational choice” was “to structure their ERISA
healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold,” and
ERISA therefore preempted the state law. Id. at 193; see also Metro. Taxicab Bd.
of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83, 93–96, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
aff’d, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (local law preempted “if it indirectly regulates
within a preempted field in such a way that effectively mandates a specific,
preempted outcome”; city taxicab rules preempted because they “do not present
viable options for Fleet Owners” to act in non-preempted manner). 1
The panel’s preemption analysis conflicts with these many authorities. It
wrongly focuses on what the Ordinance requires “[o]n its face,” without regard to
its undisputed practical effect, i.e., compelling the Platforms to remove third-party
content—the very outcome the CDA seeks to protect against. Indeed, the panel
admitted that “removing certain listings may be the Platforms’ most practical
1

This Court acknowledged Fielder’s preemption framework in Golden Gate
Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 659-61 (9th
Cir. 2008), but found the businesses challenging the allegedly preempted law had
“realistic alternative[s],” thus avoiding an inter-circuit conflict.

11
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compliance option,” Slip op. 15, and did not identify any rational alternatives for
compliance. As in National Meat, “if the [booking] ban were to avoid the [CDA’s]
preemption clause, then any State could impose any regulation on [third-party
content] just by framing it as a ban on [transactions for] whatever [type of thirdparty content] the State disapproved.” 565 U.S. at 463; see Kimzey, 836 F.3d at
1266 (parties may not “plead around the CDA to advance the same basic argument
that the statute plainly bars”; rejecting “artful skirting of the CDA’s safe harbor
provision”).
The panel decision piles conflict on top of conflict, and is incorrect as a
matter of preemption law. This Court should grant rehearing.
II.

The Panel’s Opinion Conflicts with Other Circuits’ Protection of
Websites’ “Design and Operation.”
The panel held the CDA does not preempt the Ordinance because it purports

to regulate only booking services rather than third-party listings. But booking
services are integral to the Platforms’ design and operation as publishers of thirdparty listings. Consequently, the panel’s reading conflicts with First and Second
Circuit decisions holding that the CDA preempts local laws that regulate “features
that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of [a] website.”
Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 21; Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *3 (same).
In Backpage, the First Circuit rejected a party’s efforts to circumvent CDA
immunity by predicating claims on ancillary services provided by the website. 817
12
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F.3d at 20. The plaintiffs avoided directly challenging website content, instead
attacking design features like the “acceptance of anonymous payments” and the
“lack of phone number verification.” Id. at 20-21. Although plaintiffs argued that
claims based on those services did “not treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker of
third-party content,” id. at 20, the First Circuit disagreed. It held that a website’s
“decision[s] to provide such services ... are no less publisher choices, entitled to the
protections [of the CDA].” Id. at 21.
Last month, the Second Circuit adopted the same approach, rejecting claims
ostensibly “premised on [the] design and operation of [a web platform] rather than
on its role as a publisher of third-party content.” Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at
*3. The plaintiff sought to hold a website liable for its alleged failure to implement
various ancillary features or safeguards (such as a review of IP addresses or
location verification) that would have prevented users from “impersonating” others
by creating fake accounts. Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). The Second Circuit held that Section 230 barred these claims.
Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *3.
The panel’s decision directly conflicts with Backpage and Herrick. Contrary
to those decisions, the panel held that the Ordinance is not preempted—even
though it directly targets the Platforms’ decision to “structure and operat[e]” their
websites to provide booking services for third-party listings. See ER-1849 ¶ 73

13
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(describing how the Ordinance will compel Airbnb to “undertake a fundamental
redesign” of its website); ER-1867 ¶ 9, ER-1873-74 ¶¶ 37-38. For CDA purposes,
nothing differentiates the “anonymous payment” processes the First Circuit found
protected in Backpage from the Platforms’ booking services for third-party listings.
Both deal with payment (without overtly addressing content), and both are integral
to the “design and operation” of each website. This case would have a different
result under the law in the First and Second Circuits—a “square conflict” that
warrants rehearing. See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 n.8
(1990); Ninth Circuit Rule 35–1 (same).
III.

The Panel’s Exclusion of “Nonpublic” and “Internal” Third-Party
Content from CDA Protection Conflicts with Ninth Circuit and Sister
Circuit Precedent.
The panel agreed that the CDA preempts laws that “necessarily require an

internet company to monitor third-party content.” Slip op. 13; see Internet Brands,
824 F.3d at 852-54 (CDA provides immunity from requirements to “edit, monitor,
or remove user generated content”).

But the panel concluded that “the only

monitoring that appears necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance relates to
incoming requests to complete a booking transaction—content that, while resulting
from the third-party listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic.” Slip op. 14. In so
doing, the panel trivialized the necessary monitoring as nothing more than
“keeping track of the city’s registry.” Id. The panel thus concocted a distinction

14
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between laws requiring the monitoring of public-facing third-party content (which
the CDA preempts) and laws requiring monitoring of “internal, and nonpublic”
third-party content (which, the panel says, the CDA does not preempt). Id.
That distinction has no support in the law and directly conflicts with
decisions from this and other Circuits. To begin with, as a practical matter, the
Platforms must remove non-compliant listings before guests make booking
requests—a process requiring review and monitoring of third-party content. ER1848 ¶ 70; ER-1867 ¶ 9; ER-395–96 ¶¶ 21–24, ER-504 ¶ 13. But even if the
Platforms did not remove non-compliant listings, they still would be required to
review hundreds of individual listings daily when fielding “incoming requests to
complete a booking transaction”: booking requests, standing alone, could not tell
the Platforms whether they can lawfully proceed with a booking. Id. Rather, after
receiving a request, a Platform must review the listing, check its content (and its
address) against the City’s registry, and determine whether to proceed. Id.
While this listing review may be “internal,” it remains a protected publisher
function. This Court in Internet Brands, for example, made clear that the CDA
applies to an “alleged failure to adequately ... monitor internal communications.”
824 F.3d at 853 (emphasis added). Other circuits have held that the CDA preempts
claims based on monitoring internal content. Herrick, 2019 WL 1384092, at *2
(CDA applies to claims premised on users’ “direct messages”); Backpage, 817

15
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F.3d at 21 (same).

Courts routinely have “applied the CDA to bar claims

predicated” on “nonpublic [third-party content], and have done so without
questioning whether the CDA applies in such circumstances.” Fields v. Twitter,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
2018) (collecting authorities).
The Ordinance requires the Platforms, before providing booking services, to
review a third-party host’s listing and determine whether the listed property is
registered. This indisputably compels monitoring of third-party content, which
even the panel acknowledged was a protected publisher function. The panel’s
opinion therefore creates a separate set of conflicts worthy of rehearing.
IV.

The Panel’s Obstacle Preemption Analysis Conflicts with this Circuit’s
Longstanding Interpretation of the CDA’s Purposes.
The Ordinance stands as an “obstacle to the accomplishment” of Congress’s

objectives in passing Section 230. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000). In rejecting that argument, the panel recognized only one
of several congressional purposes in passing the CDA—to encourage voluntary
“self-monitoring of third-party content”—and found the Ordinance was no obstacle
to that objective. Slip op. 16. But the panel erred in “wholly ignor[ing] other and
equally important [c]ongressional objectives.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 143 (2002). In particular, it ignored Congress’s equally
important interest in promoting “the vibrant and competitive free market that
16
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presently exists for the Internet ... unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176 (noting “robust
development of the Internet that Congress envisioned” in enacting CDA)
(McKeown, J., dissenting). Likewise, it ignored Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027, where
this Court acknowledged Congress’s intent to promote “the continued development
of the Internet,” including “the development of e-commerce” (emphasis added).
The panel’s incomplete understanding of Section 230’s purposes, and the
Ordinance’s manifest impediment to achieving those purposes, requires rehearing.
V.

The Panel’s Approach Presents a Question of Exceptional Importance
Because It Will Gravely Harm the Modern Internet Economy.
The panel’s opinion substantially threatens e-commerce and the ongoing

development of the Internet. If municipalities or plaintiffs can regulate third-party
content simply by targeting online marketplaces’ transaction processing, these
businesses—from eBay and TaskRabbit to promising startups—will be left
unprotected from a variety of content-related claims. It would allow any local
regulation or private tort claim to circumvent the CDA so long as it technically
rests on a website’s enabling third-party transactions, even if those transactions are
inextricably intertwined with the posting of third-party content. The panel itself
acknowledged its ruling would create “difficulties of complying with numerous

17
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state and local regulations” for the Platforms and other online marketplaces. Slip
op. 16.2
At the same time, the panel held that the CDA would continue to protect
outmoded bulletin board websites like Craigslist, id. at 20 (“Unlike the Platforms,
[websites like Craigslist] would not be subject to the Ordinance”), simply because
they have not integrated e-commerce functionality into their sites.

But

“[i]mmunity is not foreclosed simply because a website offers more than a
‘bulletin board’ service.” La Park La Brea A LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d
1097, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
Thus, the panel gave the Platforms (and other marketplace websites) an
impermissible choice: comply with potentially thousands of local laws across the
country and at every level of government that may seek to compel contentmonitoring and removal, or turn back the clock and adopt a Craigslist-type bulletin
board, abandoning the innovative e-commerce services that customers desire. See
ECF No. 23 (Brief of Amici Curiae eBay, et al.) at 8 (“Platforms that facilitate user

2

The panel said that “the CDA does not provide internet companies with a onesize-fits-all body of law.” Slip op. 16. Congress, however, intended the CDA “to
establish a uniform national standard of content regulation,” S. Conf. Rep. 104230, at 191 (1996), while leaving the Platforms to comply with the many laws and
regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses that do not control content.
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (CDA
treats “Internet publishers … differently from corresponding publishers in print,
television and radio”).

18
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transactions could be forced to scale back services, and potential new entrants will
be deterred from starting new businesses.”).

By endangering the ongoing

development of the Internet economy, the panel’s decision presents a question of
exceptional importance.
CONCLUSION
Rehearing or rehearing en banc should be granted.
DATED: April 26, 2019
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SUMMARY **

Civil Rights
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for
failure to state a claim, of a complaint brought by
HomeAway.com and Airbnb Inc. challenging the City of
Santa Monica’s Ordinance 2535, which imposes various
obligations on companies that host online platforms for
short-term vacation rentals.
The Ordinance, as amended in 2017, imposes four
obligations on hosting platforms: (1) collecting and
remitting Transient Occupancy Taxes; (2) regularly
disclosing listings and booking information to the City; (3)
refraining from booking properties not licensed and listed on
the City’s registry; (4) and refraining from collecting a fee
for ancillary services.
The panel rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that the
Ordinance violated the Communications Decency Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 because it required them to monitor
and remove third-party content, and therefore interfered with
federal policy protecting internet companies from liability
for posting third-party content. The panel stated that the
Ordinance prohibits processing transactions for unregistered
properties. It does not require the Platforms to review the
content provided by the hosts of listings on their websites.
Rather, the panel noted that the only monitoring that
appeared necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance
**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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related to incoming requests to complete a booking
transaction—content that, while resulting from the thirdparty listings, was distinct, internal, and nonpublic. The
panel concluded that the Ordinance was not inconsistent
with the Communications Decency Act, and therefore was
not expressly preempted by its terms. The panel further
concluded that the Ordinance would not pose an obstacle to
Congress’s aim to encourage self-monitoring of third-party
content, and therefore obstacle preemption did not preclude
Santa Monica from enforcing the Ordinance.
The panel held that the Ordinance did not implicate
speech protected by the First Amendment, concluding that
the Ordinance’s prohibitions regulate nonexpressive
conduct, specifically booking transactions, and do not single
out those engaged in expressive activity.

COUNSEL
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Tolles & Olson LLP, Washington, D.C.; Joseph W. Cotchett
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OPINION
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:
Located on the coast of Southern California, the city of
Santa Monica consists of only about eight square miles but
serves 90,000 residents and as many as 500,000 visitors on
weekends and holidays. Similar to other popular tourist
destinations, Santa Monica is struggling to manage the
disruptions brought about by the rise of short-term rentals
facilitated by innovative startups such as Appellants
HomeAway.com, Inc. and Airbnb Inc. (the “Platforms”).
Websites like those operated by the Platforms are essentially
online marketplaces that allow “guests” seeking
accommodations and “hosts” offering accommodations to
connect and enter into rental agreements with one another. 1
As of February 2018, Airbnb had approximately 1,400
listings in Santa Monica, of which about 30 percent are in
1

The Platforms do not own, lease, or manage any of the properties
listed on their websites, nor are they parties to the rental agreements.
Instead, the content provided alongside the listings—such as description,
price, and availability—are provided by the hosts. For their services, the
Platforms collect a fee from each successful booking.
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the “coastal zone” covered by the California Coastal Act,
while HomeAway.com had approximately 300 live listings
in Santa Monica, of which approximately 40 percent are in
the coastal zone.
Santa Monica’s council reported that the proliferation of
short-term rentals had negatively impacted the quality and
character of its neighborhoods by “bringing commercial
activity and removing residential housing stock from the
market” at a time when California is already suffering from
severe housing shortages. In response, the city passed an
ordinance regulating the short-term vacation rental market
by authorizing licensed “home-sharing” (rentals where
residents remain on-site with guests) but prohibiting all other
short-term home rentals of 30 consecutive days or less.
The Platforms filed suit, alleging that the city ordinance
is preempted by the Communications Decency Act and
impermissibly infringes upon their First Amendment rights.
The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, and
dismissed the Platforms’ complaints for failure to state a
claim under the Communications Decency Act and the First
Amendment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2015, Santa Monica passed its initial ordinance
regulating the short-term vacation rental market by
authorizing licensed “home-sharing” (rentals where
residents remain on-site with guests) but prohibiting all other
forms of short-term rentals for 30 consecutive days or less.
Santa Monica Ordinance 2484 (May 12, 2015), codified as
amended, Santa Monica Mun. Code §§ 6.20.010–6.20.100.
The ordinance reflected the city’s housing goals of
“preserving its housing stock and preserving the quality and
character of its existing single and multi-family residential
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neighborhoods.” Id. As originally enacted, the ordinance
prohibited hosting platforms from acting to “undertake,
maintain, authorize, aid, facilitate or advertise any HomeSharing activity” that was not authorized by the city.
Hosting platforms also were required to collect and remit
taxes, and to regularly disclose listings and booking
information to the city.
The Platforms each filed a complaint in the Central
District of California challenging the initial ordinance, and
the district court consolidated the cases for discovery and
pretrial matters. On September 21, 2016, the parties
stipulated to stay the case while the city considered
amendments to the local ordinance. During the stay period,
the district court for the Northern District of California
denied a preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiffs in
a separate case challenging a similar ordinance in San
Francisco. See Airbnb Inc. v. City & County of San
Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016). That
case ended in a settlement in which the Platforms agreed to
comply with an amended version of San Francisco’s
ordinance that prohibited booking unlawful transactions but
provided a safe harbor wherein any platform that complies
with the responsibilities set out in the Ordinance will be
presumed to be in compliance with the law.
In January 2017, Santa Monica likewise amended its
own ordinance. The version challenged here, Ordinance
2535 (the “Ordinance”), retains its prohibitions on most
types of short-term rentals, with the exception of licensed
home-shares. In addition, the Ordinance imposes four
obligations on hosting platforms directly: (1) collecting and
remitting “Transient Occupancy Taxes,” (2) disclosing
certain listing and booking information regularly,
(3) refraining from completing any booking transaction for
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properties not licensed and listed on the City’s registry, and
(4) refraining from collecting or receiving a fee for
“facilitating or providing services ancillary to a vacation
rental or unregistered home-share.” If a housing platform
operates in compliance with these obligations, the Ordinance
provides a safe harbor by presuming the platform to be in
compliance with the law. Otherwise, violations are
punishable by a fine of up to $500 and/or imprisonment for
up to six months.
After the district court lifted the stay, the Platforms
amended their complaint to challenge the revised ordinance
and moved for a preliminary injunction. Santa Monica
moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The court denied
the Platforms’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief and
subsequently granted Santa Monica’s motion to dismiss on
the ground that the Platforms failed to state a claim under
federal law, including the Communications Decency Act of
1996 and the First Amendment. The district court also
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their
remaining state-law claims. 2 The Platforms timely appealed
these decisions, and we consolidated the appeals.

2

The Platforms do not appeal the district court’s dismissal of other
federal claims brought under the Fourth Amendment and the Stored
Communications Act. Similarly, they do not challenge the court’s
decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims under the California Coastal Act if we affirm the dismissal of their
federal claims. Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal, we need
not consider the state-law claims. We deny Santa Monica’s motion for
judicial notice of its prior enforcement actions because the dispute as to
its prior actions relates only to the state-law claims.
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JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review the district court’s order of dismissal de novo,
“accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 863
(2017) (quoting Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th
Cir. 2016)).
DISCUSSION
I. Communications Decency Act
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA” or
the “Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, provides internet companies
with immunity from certain claims in furtherance of its
stated policy “to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services.” Id.
§ 230(b)(1).
Construing this immunity broadly, the
Platforms argue that the Ordinance requires them to monitor
and remove third-party content, and therefore violates the
CDA by interfering with federal policy protecting internet
companies from liability for posting third-party content.
Santa Monica, on the other hand, argues that the Ordinance
does not implicate the CDA because it imposes no obligation
on the Platforms to monitor or edit any listings provided by
hosts. Santa Monica contends that the Ordinance is simply
an exercise of its right to enact regulations to preserve
housing by curtailing “incentives for landlords to evade rent
control laws, evict tenants, and convert residential units into
de facto hotels.”
We begin our analysis with the text of the CDA. See BP
America Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006).
Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an
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interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” Id. § 230(c)(1). The CDA
explicitly preempts inconsistent state laws: “Nothing in this
section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).
We have construed these provisions to extend immunity
to “(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service
(2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of
action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided
by another information content provider.” Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009). Only the
second element is at issue here: whether the Ordinance treats
the Platforms as a “publisher or speaker” in a manner that is
barred by the CDA. Although the CDA does not define
“publisher,” we have defined “publication” in this context to
“involve[] reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to
publish or to withdraw from publication third-party
content.” Id. at 1102 (citing Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc)).
The Platforms offer two different theories as to how the
Ordinance in fact reaches “publication” activities. First, the
Platforms claim that the Ordinance is expressly preempted
by the CDA because, as they argue, it implicitly requires
them “to monitor the content of a third-party listing and
compare it against the City’s short-term rental registry
before allowing any booking to proceed.” Relying on Doe
v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016), the
Platforms take the view that CDA immunity follows
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whenever a legal duty “affects” how an internet company
“monitors” a website.
However, the Platforms read Internet Brands too
broadly. In that case, two individuals used the defendant’s
website to message and lure the plaintiff to sham auditions
where she was drugged and raped. Id. at 848. We held that,
where the website provider was alleged to have known
independently of the ongoing scheme beforehand, the CDA
did not bar an action under state law for failure to warn. Id.
at 854. We observed that a duty to warn would not
“otherwise affect how [the defendant] publishes or
monitors” user content. Id. at 851. Though the defendant
did, in its business, act as a publisher of third-party content,
the underlying legal duty at issue did not seek to hold the
defendant liable as a “publisher or speaker” of third-party
content. Id. at 853; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). We therefore
declined to extend CDA immunity to the defendant for the
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d
at 854.
We do not read Internet Brands to suggest that CDA
immunity attaches any time a legal duty might lead a
company to respond with monitoring or other publication
activities. It is not enough that third-party content is
involved; Internet Brands rejected use of a “but-for” test that
would provide immunity under the CDA solely because a
cause of action would not otherwise have accrued but for the
third-party content. Id. at 853. We look instead to what the
duty at issue actually requires: specifically, whether the duty
would necessarily require an internet company to monitor
third-party content. See id. at 851, 853.
Here, the Ordinance does not require the Platforms to
monitor third-party content and thus falls outside of the
CDA’s immunity. The Ordinance prohibits processing
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transactions for unregistered properties. It does not require
the Platforms to review the content provided by the hosts of
listings on their websites. Rather, the only monitoring that
appears necessary in order to comply with the Ordinance
relates to incoming requests to complete a booking
transaction—content that, while resulting from the thirdparty listings, is distinct, internal, and nonpublic. As in
Internet Brands, it is not enough that the third-party listings
are a “but-for” cause of such internal monitoring. See
824 F.3d at 853. The text of the CDA is “clear that neither
this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity
from liability deriving from third-party content.” Barnes,
570 F.3d at 1100. To provide broad immunity “every time a
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would
eviscerate [the CDA].” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100 (quoting
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc)). That is not the result that Congress intended.
Nor could a duty to cross-reference bookings against
Santa Monica’s property registry give rise to CDA
immunity. While keeping track of the city’s registry is
“monitoring” third-party content in the most basic sense,
such conduct cannot be fairly classified as “publication” of
third-party content. The Platforms have no editorial control
over the registry whatsoever. As with tax regulations or
criminal statutes, the Ordinance can fairly charge parties
with keeping abreast of the law without running afoul of the
CDA.
Second, the Platforms argue that the Ordinance “in
operation and effect . . . forces [them] to remove third-party
content.” Although it is clear that the Ordinance does not
expressly mandate that they do so, the Platforms claim that
“common sense explains” that they cannot “leave in place a
website chock-full of un-bookable listings.” For purposes of
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our review, we accept at face value the Platforms’ assertion
that they will choose to remove noncompliant third-party
listings on their website as a consequence of the Ordinance. 3
Nonetheless, their choice to remove listings is insufficient to
implicate the CDA.
On its face, the Ordinance does not proscribe, mandate,
or even discuss the content of the listings that the Platforms
display on their websites. See Santa Monica Mun. Code
§§ 6.20.010–6.20.100. It requires only that transactions
involve licensed properties. We acknowledge that, as the
Platforms explain in Airbnb’s complaint and in the briefing
on appeal, removal of these listings would be the best option
“from a business standpoint.” But, as in Internet Brands, the
underlying duty “could have been satisfied without changes
to content posted by the website’s users.” See 824 F.3d
at 851. Even assuming that removing certain listings may be
the Platforms’ most practical compliance option, allowing
internet companies to claim CDA immunity under these
circumstances would risk exempting them from most local
regulations and would, as this court feared in
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164, “create a lawless noman’s-land on the Internet.” We hold that the Ordinance is
not “inconsistent” with the CDA, and is therefore not
expressly preempted by its terms. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
Finally, the Platforms argue that, even if the Ordinance
is not expressly preempted by the CDA, the Ordinance
imposes “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
3

The Platforms argued below that the district court must accept as
true their allegation that they would “have to” monitor and screen
listings. As a matter of law, the Ordinance does not require them to do
so. Courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
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of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” See Crosby
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73
(2000). Reading the CDA expansively, they argue that the
Ordinance conflicts with the CDA’s goal “to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”
See § 230(b)(2). We have consistently eschewed an
expansive reading of the statute that would render unlawful
conduct “magically . . . lawful when [conducted] online,”
and therefore “giv[ing] online businesses an unfair
advantage over their real-world counterparts.”
See
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164, 1164–65 n.15. For the
same reasons, while we acknowledge the Platforms’
concerns about the difficulties of complying with numerous
state and local regulations, the CDA does not provide
internet companies with a one-size-fits-all body of law. Like
their brick-and-mortar counterparts, internet companies
must also comply with any number of local regulations
concerning, for example, employment, tax, or zoning.
Because the Ordinance would not pose an obstacle to
Congress’s aim to encourage self-monitoring of third-party
content, we hold that obstacle preemption does not preclude
Santa Monica from enforcing the Ordinance.
Fundamentally, the parties dispute how broadly to
construe the CDA so as to continue serving the purposes
Congress envisioned while allowing state and local
governments breathing room to address the pressing issues
faced by their communities.
We have previously
acknowledged that the CDA’s immunity reaches beyond the
initial state court decision that sparked its enactment. See
Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., which held an internet
company liable for defamation when it removed some, but
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not all, harmful content from its public message boards,
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)
(unpublished)). As the Platforms correctly note, the Act’s
policy statements broadly promote “the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
. . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(2). “[A] law’s scope often differs from its genesis,”
and we have repeatedly held the scope of immunity to reach
beyond defamation cases. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 (quoting
Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008), as
amended (May 2, 2008)) (citing cases applying immunity for
causes of action including discrimination, fraud, and
negligence).
At the same time, our cases have hewn closely to the
statutory language of the CDA and have limited the
expansion of its immunity beyond the protection Congress
envisioned. As we have observed, “the [relevant] section is
titled ‘Protection for “good Samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material.’”
Roommates.com,
521 F.3d at 1163–64 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)); see also
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852. Congress intended to
“spare interactive computer services [the] grim choice”
between voluntarily filtering content and being subject to
liability on the one hand, and “ignoring all problematic posts
altogether [to] escape liability.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
at 1163–64. In contrast, the Platforms face no liability for
the content of the bookings; rather, any liability arises only
from unlicensed bookings. We do not discount the
Platforms’ concerns about the administrative burdens of
state and local regulations, but we nonetheless disagree that
§ 230(c)(1) of the CDA may be read as broadly as they
advocate, or that we may ourselves expand its provisions
beyond what Congress initially intended.
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In sum, neither express preemption nor obstacle
preemption apply to the Ordinance. We therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under the
CDA.
II. First Amendment
The Platforms also contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their First Amendment claims. They argue that,
even if the plain language of the Ordinance only reaches
“conduct,” i.e., booking unlicensed properties, the law
effectively imposes a “content-based financial burden” on
commercial speech and is thus subject to First Amendment
scrutiny. The district court concluded that the Ordinance
“regulates conduct, not speech, and that the conduct banned
. . . does not have such a ‘significant expressive element’ as
to draw First Amendment protection.” We agree.
That the Ordinance regulates “conduct” is not alone
dispositive. The Supreme Court has previously applied First
Amendment scrutiny when “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’
elements are combined in the same course of conduct.” See
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). But
“restrictions on protected expression are distinct from
restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on
nonexpressive conduct.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). While the former is entitled to
protection, “the First Amendment does not prevent
restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing
incidental burdens on speech.” Id.
To determine whether the First Amendment applies, we
must first ask the “threshold question [of] whether conduct
with a ‘significant expressive element’ drew the legal
remedy or the ordinance has the inevitable effect of ‘singling
out those engaged in expressive activity.’” Int’l Franchise
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Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706–07
(1986)). A court may consider the “inevitable effect of a
statute on its face,” as well as a statute’s “stated purpose.”
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565. However, absent narrow
circumstances, a court may not conduct an inquiry into
legislative purpose or motive beyond what is stated within
the statute itself. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 n.30.
Because the conduct at issue—completing booking
transactions for unlawful rentals—consists only of
nonspeech, nonexpressive conduct, we hold that the
Ordinance does not implicate the First Amendment.
First, the prohibitions here did not target conduct with “a
significant expressive element.” See Arcara, 478 U.S.
at 706. Our decision in International Franchise Ass’n is
analogous. There, the plaintiff challenged a minimum wage
ordinance that would have accelerated the raising of the
minimum wage to $15 per hour for franchise owners and
other large employers. 803 F.3d at 389. In denying a
preliminary injunction, the district court held that the
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their First
Amendment argument that the ordinance treated them
differently based on their “speech and association” decisions
to operate within a franchise relationship framework. Id. at
408–09.
We agreed, concluding that the “business
agreement or business dealings” were not conduct with a
“significant expressive element.” Id. at 408. Instead,
“Seattle’s minimum wage ordinance [was] plainly an
economic regulation that [did] not target speech or
expressive conduct.” Id.
Similarly, here, the Ordinance is plainly a housing and
rental regulation. The “inevitable effect of the [Ordinance]
on its face” is to regulate nonexpressive conduct—namely,
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booking transactions—not speech. See Sorrell, 564 U.S.
at 565. As in International Franchise Ass’n, the “business
agreement or business dealings” associated with processing
a booking is not conduct with a “significant expressive
element.” See 803 F.3d at 408 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Contrary to the Platforms’ claim, the Ordinance
does not “require” that they monitor or screen
advertisements. It instead leaves them to decide how best to
comply with the prohibition on booking unlawful
transactions.
Nor can the Platforms rely on the Ordinance’s “stated
purpose” to argue that it intends to regulate speech. The
Ordinance itself makes clear that the City’s “central and
significant goal . . . is preservation of its housing stock and
preserving the quality and nature of residential
neighborhoods.” As such, with respect to the Platforms, the
only inevitable effect, and the stated purpose, of the
Ordinance is to prohibit them from completing booking
transactions for unlawful rentals.
As for the second prong of our inquiry, whether the
Ordinance has the effect of “singling out those engaged in
expressive activity,” Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706–07, we
conclude that it does not. As the Platforms point out,
websites like Craigslist “advertise the very same properties,”
but do not process transactions. Unlike the Platforms, those
websites would not be subject to the Ordinance,
underscoring that the Ordinance does not target websites that
post listings, but rather companies that engage in unlawful
booking transactions.
Moreover, the incidental impacts on speech cited by the
Platforms raise minimal concerns. The Platforms argue that
the Ordinance chills commercial speech, namely,
advertisements for third-party rentals. But even accepting
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that the Platforms will need to engage in efforts to validate
transactions before completing them, incidental burdens like
these are not always sufficient to trigger First Amendment
scrutiny. See Int’l Franchise Ass’n, 803 F.3d at 408
(“[S]ubjecting every incidental impact on speech to First
Amendment scrutiny ‘would lead to the absurd result that
any government action that had some conceivable speech
inhibiting consequences . . . would require analysis under
the First Amendment.’” (quoting Arcara, 478 U.S. at 708
(O’Connor, J., concurring))). Furthermore, to the extent that
the speech chilled advertises unlawful rentals, “[a]ny First
Amendment interest . . . is altogether absent when the
commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on
advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic
activity.” See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973).
Finally, because the Ordinance does not implicate speech
protected by the First Amendment, we similarly reject the
Platforms’ argument that the Ordinance is unconstitutional
without a scienter requirement. In most cases, there is no
“closed definition” on when a criminal statute must contain
a scienter requirement. See Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952). However, the Supreme Court has
drawn a bright line in certain contexts, such as holding that
the First Amendment requires statutes imposing criminal
liability for obscenity or child pornography to contain a
scienter requirement. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
765 (1982). Such a requirement prevents “a severe
limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected
matter” as would result from inflexible laws criminalizing
“bookshops and periodical stands.” Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).

Case: 18-55367, 04/26/2019, ID: 11279514, DktEntry: 88, Page 48 of 66
22

HOMEAWAY.COM V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA

Here, even assuming that the Ordinance would lead the
Platforms to voluntarily remove some advertisements for
lawful rentals, there would not be a “severe limitation on the
public’s access” to lawful advertisements, especially
considering the existence of alternative channels like
Craigslist. Id. Such an incidental burden is far from “a
substantial restriction on the freedom of speech” that would
necessitate a scienter requirement. Id. at 150. Otherwise,
“[t]here is no specific constitutional inhibition against
making the distributors of good[s] the strictest censors of
their merchandise.” Id. at 152.
III. Remaining Claims
On appeal, the Platforms do not challenge dismissal of
their other federal law claims “in light of the district court’s
interpretation of the Ordinance as only requiring disclosure
of information pursuant to requests that comply with the
Fourth Amendment and Stored Communications Act.”
Similarly, the parties specified that they would “not
challenge the district court’s decision to decline
supplemental jurisdiction if all the Platforms’ federal claims
were properly dismissed.” Accordingly, we need not
consider the remaining claims.
*

*

*

Because the district court properly dismissed the
Platforms’ complaints for failure to state a claim, we dismiss
as moot the appeals from the denial of preliminary injunctive
relief.
AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.
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47 U.S.C. § 230.
Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer
services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our
citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information
that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the
future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation;
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(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's
access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of
computer.
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1).1

1

So in original. Likely should be “subparagraph (A).”
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(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an
agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in
a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental
control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are
commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material
that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with
access to information identifying, current providers of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement
of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal
criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments
made by such Act, or any similar State law.
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(5) No effect on sex trafficking law
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed
to impair or limit—
(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of title 18,
United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a
violation of section 1591 of that title;
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of
section 1591 of title 18, United States Code; or
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of
section 2421A of title 18, United States Code, and promotion or
facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the
defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
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information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.
(4) Access software provider
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software
(including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or
more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset,
organize, reorganize, or translate content.
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City Council Meeting: January 24, 2017

Santa Monica, California

ORDINANCE NUMBER 253-b
(City Council Series)

(CCS)

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
SANTA MONICA AMENDING AND REVISING CHAPTER 6.20 OF THE SANTA
MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE REGULATING HOME-SHARING AND VACATION
RENTALS
WHEREAS, a central and significant goal for the City is preservation of its housing
stock and preserving the quality and character of residential neighborhoods. Santa
Monica places a high value on cohesive and active residential neighborhoods and the
diverse population which resides therein. The City must preserve its available housing
stock and the character and charm which result, in part, from cultural, ethnic, and
economic diversity of its resident population as a key factor in economic growth; and
WHEREAS, Santa Monica's natural beauty, its charming residential communities,
its vibrant commercial quarters and its world class visitor serving amenities have drawn
visitors from around the United States and around the world; and
WHEREAS, there is within the City a diverse array of short term rentals for visitors,
including, hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, vacation rentals and home sharing, not all
of which are lawful; and
WHEREAS, operations of vacation rentals, where residents rent entire units to
visitors and are not present during the visitors' stays, frequently disrupt the quietude and
residential character of the neighborhoods and adversely impact the community; and

1
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WHEREAS, on May 12, 2015, the City Council adopted Ordinance Number 2484
which preserved the City's prohibition on vacation rentals, but authorized "home-sharing,"
whereby residents host visitors in their homes for short periods of stay, for compensation,
while the resident host remains present throughout the visitors' stay; and
WHEREAS, home-sharing does not create the same adverse impacts as
unsupervised vacation rentals because, among other things, the resident hosts are
present to introduce their guests to the City's neighborhoods and regulate their guests'
behavior; and
WHEREAS, while the City recognizes that home-sharing activities can be
conducted in harmony with surrounding uses, those activities must be regulated to ensure
that the small number of home-sharers stay in safe structures and do not threaten or harm
the public health or welfare; and
WHEREAS, any monetary compensation paid to the resident hosts for their
hospitality and hosting efforts rightfully belong to such hosts and existing law authorizes
the City to collect Transient Occupancy Taxes ("TOTs") for vacation rentals and homesharing activities; and
WHEREAS, existing law obligates both the hosts and rental agencies or hosting
platforms to collect and remit TOTs to the City; and
WHEREAS, enforcement of the City's regulations on home-sharing, and
prohibition on vacation rentals, can be extremely difficult without the cooperation of
internet companies which facilitate both legal and illegal short term rentals; and

2
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WHEREAS, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the City must be able to hold
internet companies which

profit from facilitating

short-term

rental transactions

accountable for enabling illegal conduct; and
WHEREAS, the City Council now wishes to clarify its regulations on short term
rentals as they apply to hosting platforms which are internet companies that collect
income by facilitating transactions between hosts and visitors in the short term rental
marketplace; and
WHEREAS, the City wishes to regulate the conduct of hosting platforms, but does
not intend to regulate hosting platforms' publication or removal of content provided by
third parties; and
WHEREAS, the City does not intend to require hosting platforms to verify content
provided by third parties or to ensure that short term rental hosts comply with the
provisions of this Chapter.
NOW, THEREFORE, THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA
DOES HEREBY ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. Santa Monica Municipal Code Chapter 6.20 is hereby amended to
read as follows:

Chapter 6.20 HOME-SHARING AND VACATION RENTALS
6.20.010 Definitions.

For purposes of this Chapter, the following words or phrases shall have the following
meanings:

3
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(a) Home-Sharing. An activity whereby the residents host visitors in their homes, for
compensation, for periods of thirty consecutive days or less, while at least one of the
dwelling unit's primary residents lives on-site, in the dwelling unit, throughout the
visitors' stay. (b)

Host. Any person who is an owner, lessee, or sub-lessee of a

residential property or unit offered for use as a vacation rental or home-share. Host also
includes any person who offers, facilitates, or provides services to facilitate, a vacation
rental or home-share, including but not limited to insurance, concierge services,
catering, restaurant bookings, tours, guide services, entertainment, cleaning, property
management, or maintenance of the residential property or unit regardless of whether
the person is an owner, lessee, or sub-lessee of a residential property or unit offered for
use as a vacation rental or home-share. Any person, other than an owner, lessee, or
sub-lessee, who operates home-sharing or vacation rental activities exclusively on the
Internet shall not be considered a Host.
(c)

Hosting Platform. A person who participates in the home-sharing or vacation

rental business by collecting or receiving a fee, directly or indirectly through an agent or
intermediary, for conducting a booking transaction using any medium of facilitation.
(d)

Booking Transaction. Any reservation or payment service provided by a person

who facilitates a home-sharing or vacation rental transaction between a prospective
transient user and a host.
(e)

Person. Any natural person, joint venture, joint stock company, partnership,

association, club, company, corporation, business trust, or organization of any kind.
(f) Vacation Rental. Rental of any dwelling unit, in whole or in part, within the City of
Santa Monica, to any person(s) for exclusive transient use of thirty consecutive days or

4
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less, whereby the unit is only approved for permanent residential occupancy and not
approved for transient occupancy or home-sharing as authorized by this Chapter.
Rental of units located within City approved hotels, motels and bed and breakfasts shall
not be considered vacation rentals.

6.20.020 Home-sharing authorization.
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this Code to the contrary, home-sharing shall
be authorized in the City, provided that the host complies with each of the following
requirements:
(1) Obtains and maintains at all times a City business license authorizing homesharing activity.
(2) Operates the home-sharing activity in compliance with all business license
permit conditions, which may be imposed by the City to effectuate the purpose of this
Chapter.
(3) Collects and remits Transient Occupancy Tax ("TOT"), in coordination with any
hosting platform if utilized, to the City and complies with all City TOT requirements as
set forth in Chapter 6.68 of this Code.
(4) Takes responsibility for and actively prevents any nuisance activities that may
take place as a result of home-sharing activities.
(5) Complies with all applicable laws, including all health, safety, building, fire
protection, and rent control laws.
(6)

Complies with the regulations promulgated pursuant to this Chapter.

5
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(b)

All hosts and their respective properties, authorized by the City for home-sharing

purposes pursuant to this Section, shall be listed on a registry created by the City and
updated periodically by the City. The City shall publish the registry, and a copy shall be
sent electronically to any person upon request.
(c) If any provision of this Chapter conflicts with any provision of the Zoning Ordinance
codified in Article IX of this Code, the terms of this Chapter shall prevail.

6.20.030 Prohibitions.

No host shall undertake, maintain, authorize, aid, facilitate or advertise any
vacation rental activity or any home-sharing activity that does not comply with Section
6.20.020 of this Code.

6.20.050 Hosting platform responsibilities.

(a)

Hosting platforms shall be responsible for collecting all applicable TOTs and

remitting the same to the City. The hosting platform shall be considered an agent of the
host for purposes of TOT collections and remittance responsibilities as set forth in
Chapter 6.68 of this Code.
(b)

Subject to applicable laws, Hosting platforms shall disclose to the City on a

regular basis each home-sharing and vacation rental listing located in the City, the
names of the persons responsible for each such listing, the address of each such listing,
the length of stay for each such listing and the price paid for each stay.
(c)

Hosting platforms shall not complete any booking transaction for any residential

property or unit unless it is listed on the City's registry created under section 6.20.020
6
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subsection (b), at the time the hosting platform receives a fee for the booking
transaction.
(d)

Hosting platforms shall not collect or receive a fee, directly or indirectly through

an agent or intermediary, for facilitating or providing services ancillary to a vacation
rental or unregistered home-share, including but not limited to insurance, concierge
services, catering, restaurant bookings, tours, guide services, entertainment, cleaning,
property management, or maintenance of the residential property or unit.
(e)

Safe Harbor: A Hosting Platform operating exclusively on the Internet, which

operates in compliance with subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above, shall be presumed
to be in compliance with this Chapter, except that the Hosting Platform remains
responsible for compliance with the administrative subpoena provisions of this Chapter.
(f)

The provisions of this section shall be interpreted in accordance with otherwise

applicable state and federal law(s) and will not apply if determined by the City to be in
violation of, or preempted by, any such law(s).

6.20.080 Regulations.
The City Manager or his or her designee may promulgate regulations, which may
include, but are not limited to, permit conditions, reporting requirements, inspection
frequencies, enforcement procedures, advertising restrictions, disclosure requirements,
administrative subpoena procedures or insurance requirements, to implement the
provisions of this Chapter. No person shall fail to comply with any such regulation.

6.20.090 Fees.

7
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The City Council may establish and set by resolution all fees and charges as may be
necessary to effectuate the purpose of this Chapter.

6.20.100 Enforcement.
(a) Any host violating any provision of this Chapter, or hosting platform that violates
its obligations under section 6.20.050, shall be guilty of an infraction, which shall be
punishable by a fine not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars, or a misdemeanor, which
shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in
the County Jail for a period not exceeding six months or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
(b) Any person convicted of violating any provision of this Chapter in a criminal
case or found to be in violation of this Chapter in a civil or administrative case brought
by a law enforcement agency shall be ordered to reimburse the City and other
participating law enforcement agencies their full investigative costs, pay all back TOTs,
and remit all illegally obtained re.ntal revenue to the City so that it may be returned to the
home-sharing visitors or used to compensate victims of illegal short term rental
activities.
(c) Any host who violates any provision of this Chapter, or hosting platform that
violates its obligations under section 6.20.050, shall be subject to administrative fines
and administrative penalties pursuant to Chapter 1.09 and Chapter 1.1 O of this Code.
(d) Any interested person may seek an injunction or other relief to prevent or
remedy violations of this Chapter. The prevailing party in such an action shall be entitled
to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees.
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(e) The City may issue and serve administrative subpoenas as necessary to obtain
specific information regarding home-sharing and vacation rental listings located in the
City, including but not limited to, the names of the persons responsible for each such
listing, the address of each such listing, the length of stay for each such listing and the
price paid for each stay, to determine whether the home-sharing and vacation rental
listings comply with this Chapter. Any subpoena issued pursuant to this section shall not
require the production of information sooner than 30 days from the date of service. A
person that has been served with an administrative subpoena may seek judicial review
during that 30 day period.

(f) The remedies provided in this Section are not exclusive, and nothing in this
section shall preclude the use or application of any other remedies, penalties or
procedures established by law.

SECTION 2. Any provision of the Santa Monica Municipal Code or appendices
thereto inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, to the extent of such
inconsistencies and no further, is hereby repealed or modified to that extent necessary
to effect the provisions of this Ordinance.
SECTION 3. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this
Ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a decision of any
court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the
remaining portions of this Ordinance. The City Council hereby declares that it would
have passed this Ordinance and each and every section, subsection, sentence, clause,
or phrase not declared invalid or unconstitutional without regard to whether any portion
of the ordinance would be subsequently declared invalid or unconstitutional.
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SECTION 4. The Mayor shall sign and the City Clerk shall attest to the passage
of this Ordinance. The City Clerk shall cause the same to be published once in the
official newspaper within 15 days after its adoption. This Ordinance shall become
effective 30 days from its adoption.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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Approved and adopted this 24th day of January, 2017.

Ted Winterer, Mayor
State of California
County of Los Angeles
City of Santa Monica

)
) ss.
)

I, Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk of the City of Santa Monica, do
hereby certify that the foregoing Ordinance No. 2535 (CCS) had its introduction
on January 10, 2017, and was adopted at the Santa Monica City Council meeting
held on January 24, 2017, by the following vote:

AYES:

Councilmembers McKeown, O'Connor, O'Day, Vazquez;
Mayor Pro Tern Davis, Mayor Winterer

NOES:

None

ABSENT: Councilmember Himmelrich

ATTEST:

2/):oj l'i
Denise Anderson-Warren, City Clerk

Date

A summary of Ordinance No. 2535 (CCS) was duly published pursuant to
California Government Code Section 40806.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 26, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing
document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and
that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

April 26, 2019

/s/ Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

